Archive for category: Blog

As a criminal defense attorney in Atlanta, I regularly see cases where smartphone data becomes a focal point of an investigation. Clients ask how to keep personal information on an iPhone private against tools such as Cellebrite that law enforcement uses for forensic extraction, or against access through iCloud backups. The purpose of these steps is lawful privacy protection, not concealment of anything improper.

Critical disclaimer: You must never destroy evidence. If a phone holds material that is or may become relevant to an investigation, court order, or legal proceeding, wiping it, deleting data, or making it inaccessible after you know it is sought can result in criminal charges for obstruction of justice or evidence tampering under Georgia and federal law. These instructions cover preventive security measures you can take in advance. They are not guidance on destroying or hiding evidence. Seek advice from your own attorney for any specific situation.

The following steps strengthen an iPhone against common forensic extraction methods and limit what can be obtained from iCloud. Perform them while you still have full control of the device. Results depend on the iOS version, hardware, and the specific capabilities of the tools available at the time of any examination. No configuration is absolute proof against a determined laboratory with physical possession of the phone.

First, set a strong passcode. Open Settings, then Face ID and Passcode or Touch ID and Passcode. Turn on Passcode if it is not already enabled and choose a custom alphanumeric code that combines letters, numbers, and symbols. Avoid short numeric PINs, birthdays, or simple patterns. A longer complex code makes brute-force attempts far less practical because the Secure Enclave enforces increasing delays after failed tries.

Second, keep the software current. Go to Settings, General, Software Update and install any available iOS updates. Apple frequently closes the exact technical pathways that forensic tools rely on. Running an outdated version leaves known openings that newer releases close.

Third, restrict USB data access. In Settings, Face ID and Passcode or Touch ID and Passcode, scroll to USB Accessories and turn the option off, or set Wired Devices under Privacy and Security so that data connections are limited when the phone is locked. This activates USB Restricted Mode, which prevents most data transfer over the charging port after a period of lock time and complicates connection to extraction hardware.

Fourth, enable Lockdown Mode. Open Settings, Privacy and Security, then Lockdown Mode and turn it on. Confirm the restart. This feature tightens multiple attack surfaces that forensic tools and spyware exploit, limits certain USB behaviors, and contributes to automatic restart after prolonged inactivity, returning the device to a more protected before-first-unlock state.

Fifth, turn on Stolen Device Protection. In Settings, Face ID and Passcode, enable Stolen Device Protection. When the phone is away from familiar locations, sensitive actions require biometric confirmation rather than just the passcode. This adds friction to pairing and certain extraction steps even if the passcode is known.

Sixth, power the device completely off if you anticipate a situation where seizure is possible. A phone that has been powered down and has not been unlocked since the last boot holds fewer usable encryption keys in memory. This before-first-unlock condition substantially limits what most extraction tools can recover compared with a phone that has been unlocked at least once after powering on.

Seventh, address iCloud specifically. Open Settings, tap your name at the top, then iCloud. To remove the cloud backup avenue entirely, select iCloud Backup and turn off Back Up This iPhone. Confirm the change. Existing backups can then be deleted from the same screen if desired. If you prefer to keep some cloud functionality with stronger encryption, instead go to Advanced Data Protection under iCloud and turn it on. This places the encryption keys for most iCloud data, including backups, under your control so Apple cannot decrypt the content even when served with legal process. Review the list of services that remain outside full end-to-end encryption, such as Mail, Contacts, and Calendars, and disable any you do not need.

Eighth, limit additional exposure. Under Settings, Privacy and Security, review Location Services, Photos, Contacts, and other permissions and restrict them to only what is necessary. Avoid pairing the phone with computers you do not fully control. If you need local backups, create encrypted backups through Finder on a Mac or the Apple Devices app on Windows and protect them with a separate strong password. Disable any unnecessary iCloud sync features for apps that store sensitive material.

These configuration changes raise the practical difficulty of extracting personal data through physical forensic tools or through Apple’s cloud infrastructure. They do not create an impenetrable barrier, especially if the phone is seized while unlocked or if a current exploit exists for that particular hardware and software combination. They do reduce the volume of readily available information and force any examination to confront stronger protections.

Privacy remains a legitimate interest for lawyers handling confidential client matters and for private citizens who prefer that their personal communications and files stay private. Complete these steps while the device remains in your possession. Once a phone is seized under a valid warrant, configuration options are no longer available. Never destroy evidence. If circumstances arise in which a device may contain material relevant to a case, contact counsel immediately for guidance on the proper legal response rather than taking unilateral action that could create additional criminal exposure.

EAVESDROPPING: What To Know

Georgia’s surveillance statute is found primarily in O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62, which generally prohibits certain forms of secretly observing or recording people when they are in a place where they have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The basic idea is pretty simple: Georgia allows people to be recorded or observed in public or other places where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, but the law puts significant restrictions on secretly recording someone who is in a private place and out of public view.

Under § 16-11-62(2), it is generally unlawful to use a device—such as a phone, camera, or other recording equipment—to observe, photograph, or record another person’s activities without that person’s consent when those activities occur in a private place and are not in public view. So, when evaluating a potential surveillance violation, you want to ask several questions: Was a device used? Was the person recorded or observed without consent? Was the person in a private place? And was what the person was doing out of public view? If those circumstances are present, the conduct potentially falls within the statute.

The phrase “private place” is particularly important. Georgia courts have generally focused on whether the person had a reasonable expectation of being protected from intrusion or surveillance in the particular location. A bathroom, bedroom, or similarly secluded area would ordinarily present a much stronger privacy interest than a driveway, parking lot, hallway, or other area visible to the public. Importantly, the statute is concerned with the place where the person is located, rather than simply whether the subject matter being recorded is inherently private.

It is also important not to confuse Georgia’s one-party-consent rule for recording conversations with the law governing visual surveillance. Georgia generally permits a person who is a party to a conversation to record that conversation without obtaining consent from everyone else. But that does not mean someone can secretly videotape another person in a private location. Visual surveillance under § 16-11-62 has its own requirements, and the fact that someone could legally record a conversation does not necessarily give that person permission to secretly record video of another person’s private activities.

There are also statutory exceptions. For example, Georgia law allows certain surveillance conducted for security, crime prevention, or crime detection in areas where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. There are also provisions addressing surveillance on residential property and surveillance conducted by law enforcement officers in the lawful performance of their duties. That’s why a homeowner having a security camera pointed toward a driveway is fundamentally different from someone secretly placing a camera inside a bathroom or bedroom.

Section 16-11-62(3) is also worth paying attention to because it addresses going onto or about another person’s premises or a private place for the purpose of invading that person’s privacy through eavesdropping or secretly observing the person’s activities. So the statute isn’t

limited to situations where someone simply happens to have a camera running; the circumstances surrounding the observation and the person’s purpose can matter as well.

From a defense perspective, I would not reduce a surveillance case to simply, “There was a camera and the person didn’t consent.” The better analysis is to focus on where the alleged victim was, whether that location actually qualifies as a private place, whether the activity was truly out of public view, how the recording was made, who owned or controlled the property, whether anyone consented, whether a statutory exception applies, and what the defendant’s purpose was. Those details can make the difference between conduct that falls squarely within § 16-11-62 and conduct that does not.

Finally, there can be an important evidentiary consequence. Under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-67, evidence obtained in violation of Georgia’s surveillance and wiretap provisions is generally inadmissible, subject to the statute’s exceptions. So in a criminal case, there are really two separate questions: first, did the State prove that the defendant violated § 16-11-62; and second, if the recording was obtained illegally, is the State nevertheless permitted to use that recording or evidence derived from it? Those two issues should be analyzed separately.

If you’ve been charged under Georgia’s surveillance statute give our office a call TODAY at (404)581-0999.

Being an accomplice means you can be held legally responsible for a crime even if you didn’t actually carry it out yourself. The idea is that if you intentionally help, encourage, or assist someone in committing a crime, the law may treat you as a participant in that crime.

Think of it like this: imagine two friends decide to rob a store. One person goes inside and steals the money, while the other waits outside as the getaway driver. Even though the driver never enters the store or takes any cash, they knowingly helped make the robbery happen. Because of that, they can be charged as an accomplice.

Here are a few more examples:

• Helping someone commit a crime: Alex knows Jordan plans to break into a house and lends Jordan a crowbar specifically for that purpose. Even if Alex stays home, lending the tool with the intent to help could make Alex an accomplice.
• Acting as a lookout: Taylor stands outside a building and watches for police while Casey steals equipment from inside. Taylor never touches the stolen property, but serving as a lookout is a form of assistance.
• Encouraging the crime: Morgan repeatedly urges a friend to vandalize a car and helps plan when to do it. If the friend follows through, Morgan’s intentional encouragement may be enough to create accomplice liability.

On the other hand, simply being present at the scene of a crime is usually not enough. For example, if someone is standing nearby when a fight breaks out but doesn’t help, encourage, or participate, they generally aren’t considered an accomplice just because they were there.

Likewise, knowing that a crime is happening without doing anything is not always enough by itself to make someone an accomplice. In most cases, prosecutors must show that the person intended to help or encourage the crime in some way.

The exact rules vary by jurisdiction, but prosecutors generally must prove two key things:

1. The person knowingly helped, encouraged, or assisted the crime.
2. The person intended for their actions to aid the commission of the crime.

So, in everyday terms, an accomplice isn’t just someone who is nearby—they’re someone who intentionally plays a role in helping the crime happen, even if they never commit the main criminal act themselves.

If you find yourselves in this situation give our office a call and speak with one of our experienced attorneys TODAY at (404)581-0999.

Under Georgia law, judges now have clear authority to depart from the usual sentencing ranges in murder cases and other serious offenses when a defendant’s history of family violence, dating violence, or child abuse played a significant role in the crime. This authority comes from O.C.G.A. § 17-10-22, a provision added by the Survivor Justice Act that took effect in 2025.

At the time of sentencing, a defendant may present evidence showing that he or she was subjected to acts of family violence, dating violence, or child abuse and that this history was a significant contributing factor to the offense. The evidence can include records, testimony, and other materials that demonstrate the connection between the prior abuse and the conduct that led to the conviction.

If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was subjected to such abuse and that it significantly contributed to the offense, the court must impose a mitigated sentence. The same result follows if the prosecution consents and the court determines that mitigation is in the interests of justice.

For any offense that is otherwise punishable by death or by life imprisonment, including murder, the mitigated sentence under this statute is a term of imprisonment of not less than ten years and not more than thirty years. The court retains authority to depart further downward in appropriate circumstances and to structure the sentence so that the defendant remains eligible for parole or early release consideration.

This framework treats sentencing as a distinct phase that focuses on the full context of the defendant’s experiences. It does not erase criminal responsibility, but it requires the court to account for the reality that a history of abuse can shape a person’s choices and actions in ways that ordinary sentencing ranges do not capture.

For individuals already serving sentences imposed before the statute took effect, related provisions allow petitions for resentencing under the same standards when the original sentence did not fully consider this type of evidence.

At Peach State Lawyer, we examine every murder and serious felony case for potential application of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-22. Gathering the necessary documentation, presenting it effectively, and arguing the statutory factors requires careful preparation. If you or a family member faces sentencing or is already serving a lengthy term in a case involving a history of abuse, contact our office to discuss whether this provision may apply.