A new bill introduced in Georgia’s statehouse aims to protect artistic expression in the courtroom, specifically targeting rap music and other forms of creative work. House Bill 237, introduced during the 2025-2026 legislative session, seeks to prevent rap lyrics—or any other artistic expression such as music, dance, performance art, poetry, literature, film, and visual art—from being used as evidence in criminal trials, unless certain conditions are met.

Under this proposed law, in order for rap lyrics or any other form of artistic expression to be admissible at trial, prosecutors must meet four specific requirements:

1. Intent: The defendant must have intended to adopt the literal meaning of the artistic work as their own statement or belief.
2. Factual Nexus: There must be a clear connection between the artwork and the specific facts of the alleged crime.
3. Relevance: The artwork must be relevant to an issue that is in dispute during the trial.
4. Probative Value: The artwork must have distinct probative value that cannot be demonstrated by other admissible evidence.

Prosecutors must prove all four of these elements by clear and convincing evidence in a pre-trial hearing. If they fail to do so, the artwork cannot be used as evidence in the trial.

The bill’s main goal is to protect the First Amendment rights of individuals, ensuring that creative works are not unfairly used against defendants in criminal cases. The bill, which has gained bipartisan support, was introduced by State Representative Kasey Carpenter.

As the bill moves forward, it highlights the ongoing conversation about the intersection of art, expression, and the law. If passed, this legislation could have significant implications for how creative works are treated in Georgia courtrooms.

At W. Scott Smith, P.C., we understand that facing criminal charges can be overwhelming. Our experienced team is here to defend your rights, navigate complex legal issues, and provide the representation you need. Below, we’ve summarized several recent important Georgia Court of Appeals cases to illustrate the range of issues that can arise in criminal cases. If you or a loved one are dealing with criminal charges, give us a call today at 404-581-0999 for a free consultation.

Taylor v. The State (A24A1486)

Jimmy Taylor was convicted of 44 counts of elder exploitation, 22 counts of practicing medicine without a license, attempting to practice medicine without a license, and driving with a suspended license—resulting in a staggering 203-year sentence. Taylor chose to represent himself, raising significant questions about his understanding of his right to legal counsel. Despite his appeal arguing that the trial court failed to adequately warn him about the risks of self-representation, the court upheld the convictions, finding that Taylor knowingly waived his right to counsel.

Representing yourself in court is perilous and can have dire consequences. Jimmy Taylor received a 203-year sentence.  If you’re charged with a crime, don’t navigate the system without a lawyer.

Fuller v. The State (A24A1446)

On February 21, 2025, the Georgia Court of Appeals issued a decision in Fuller v. The State (A24A1446), a case involving serious charges and significant legal questions. The court’s ruling provides insight into the application of evidentiary standards, sufficiency of evidence, and cumulative error in criminal trials. Here’s a breakdown of the case and its implications.

Case Background

Christopher Fuller was convicted by a Coweta County jury of multiple charges, including rape, family violence aggravated assault, and hindering an emergency phone call. He appealed the convictions, arguing three key points:

1. The trial court committed plain error by admitting character evidence and evidence of prior difficulties with the victim.
2. The cumulative effect of these evidentiary errors warranted a new trial.
3. The evidence was insufficient to support convictions for family violence aggravated assault by strangulation and hindering an emergency phone call.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Fuller’s convictions for rape and family violence aggravated assault but reversed his conviction for hindering an emergency phone call. Let’s take a closer look at the court’s reasoning.

Evidentiary Issues: Prior Difficulties and Character Evidence

Fuller contended that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior domestic abuse incidents between him and the victim, as well as testimony about the couple’s financial struggles and the victim’s children’s dislike of him. He argued that this evidence was inadmissible under Georgia Evidence Code OCGA § 24-4-404 (b), which restricts character evidence, and OCGA § 24-4-403, which excludes evidence if its prejudicial impact substantially outweighs its probative value.

 

The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding no plain error in the admission of this evidence. The court explained that prior incidents of domestic violence were relevant to show the nature of the relationship between Fuller and the victim, as well as Fuller’s motive and intent. For example, Fuller’s history of violence against the victim helped explain his actions during the assault.

Additionally, the court found that the testimony about the couple’s financial troubles and the victim’s children’s feelings toward Fuller, even if potentially prejudicial, was not so harmful as to warrant reversal. The testimony about the financial situation was deemed intrinsic evidence, directly tied to the altercation that led to the crimes. As for the children’s feelings, the court concluded that any error in admitting this testimony was harmless, given the strength of other evidence against Fuller.

Sufficiency of Evidence

Fuller also challenged the sufficiency of evidence supporting two specific convictions: family violence aggravated assault by strangulation and hindering an emergency phone call.

1. Aggravated Assault by Strangulation

The court upheld Fuller’s conviction for aggravated assault by strangulation, pointing to the victim’s testimony and photographic evidence of her injuries. The victim described how Fuller placed his hands around her neck, applied pressure, and attempted to twist her neck. This evidence met the statutory definition of strangulation under OCGA § 16-5-19 (11), which involves “impeding the normal breathing or circulation of blood by applying pressure to the throat or neck.”

Notably, the court rejected Fuller’s argument that the State needed to prove actual impediment of breathing or circulation. Instead, it clarified that the statute only requires proof that the defendant’s actions were likely to result in strangulation. The jury was authorized to conclude that Fuller’s actions met this standard.

2. Hindering an Emergency Phone Call

The court reversed Fuller’s conviction for hindering an emergency phone call under OCGA § 16-10-24.3, which requires proof that the defendant obstructed or prevented a person from calling 911 or law enforcement. While the victim testified that Fuller broke her phone during the altercation, she did not specify that she was attempting to dial 911 or law enforcement at the time. The State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish this essential element of the offense, leading the court to reverse the conviction.

Cumulative Error Doctrine

Fuller argued that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s evidentiary errors warranted a new trial. However, the Court of Appeals rejected this argument, noting that cumulative error requires at least two errors during trial. Because the court found only one presumed error (related to the children’s testimony), the cumulative error doctrine did not apply.

 

 

Key Takeaways

The Fuller decision underscores several important principles in Georgia criminal law:

1. Admissibility of Prior Difficulties Evidence: Evidence of prior domestic violence is often admissible to show the nature of the defendant’s relationship with the victim and the defendant’s intent or motive.
2. Sufficiency of Evidence for Strangulation: The State does not need to prove actual impediment of breathing or circulation to secure a conviction for strangulation; evidence that the defendant’s actions were likely to result in such impediments is sufficient.
3. Hindering Emergency Calls: Prosecutors must present clear evidence that the defendant specifically obstructed or prevented a call to 911 or law enforcement. General testimony about phone damage may not suffice.
4. Cumulative Error Doctrine: This doctrine applies only when multiple trial errors occur. A single error, even if presumed, is insufficient to justify reversal under this doctrine.

Conclusion

While the Court of Appeals affirmed most of Fuller’s convictions, its decision to reverse the hindering an emergency phone call charge demonstrates the importance of scrutinizing the sufficiency of evidence for each element of a crime. This case serves as a reminder of the high evidentiary standards required to sustain criminal convictions and the nuanced application of Georgia’s evidence rules.

For defense attorneys and prosecutors alike, Fuller v. The State highlights critical issues to consider when handling cases involving domestic violence, evidentiary challenges, and statutory interpretation.

Snyder v. The State (A24A1554)

Vivian Snyder argued that her DUI blood test results should be suppressed because a law enforcement officer, rather than a medical professional, performed the blood draw. The court upheld the legality of the draw, noting that the officer was a certified phlebotomist and qualified under Georgia law.

Hutchins v. The State (A24A1781)

The recent decision in Hutchins v. The State (A24A1781, decided February 4, 2025) sheds light on several important legal principles surrounding drug convictions, the sufficiency of evidence, and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Georgia Court of Appeals addressed these issues in a case involving Marcus Hutchins, who was convicted on multiple drug-related charges, including possession with intent to distribute marijuana, methamphetamine, and oxycodone, as well as crossing a prison guard line with drugs. Below, we break down the key legal takeaways from the case.

 

Marcus Hutchins was convicted after law enforcement found various drugs in his vehicle near a prison guard line. The evidence included marijuana, methamphetamine, and oxycodone pills. Hutchins challenged his conviction on two primary grounds:

1. The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for possession of oxycodone.
2. Ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial.

Sufficiency of Evidence: The Role of “Other Qualified Evidence”

Hutchins argued that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the pills found in his vehicle were oxycodone because no chemical testing was conducted. Instead, law enforcement relied on “logo identification” from a drug database and the pills’ physical appearance.

The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, emphasizing that expert testimony based on visual identification can be sufficient to support a conviction when corroborated by other circumstantial evidence. In this case, the arresting officer found the pills hidden alongside other illicit substances (methamphetamine and marijuana) and in circumstances suggesting intent to distribute. The Court also noted that Hutchins exhibited behavior consistent with knowledge of the contraband, such as hiding the pills and drugs under the floorboard and falsely claiming ignorance of their presence.

The court cited Graves v. State (306 Ga. 485, 487) to reiterate that circumstantial evidence and expert testimony—when unchallenged—can satisfy the burden of proof in drug possession cases. This decision aligns with prior rulings that stress the importance of the jury’s role in weighing evidence and drawing reasonable inferences.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: A High Bar for Defendants

Hutchins also claimed that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the identification of the pills as oxycodone without chemical testing. To prove ineffective assistance under the Strickland v. Washington standard, a defendant must show both (1) that their counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficiency prejudiced their defense.

The Court found that Hutchins failed to meet either prong. His trial attorney testified during the motion for new trial hearing that he strategically chose not to challenge the identification of the pills because the State’s evidence on other charges was overwhelming. Counsel also cross-examined the forensic chemist to highlight the possibility of counterfeit pills, arguing this point to the jury during closing arguments. The Court ruled that this was a reasonable trial strategy and not “patently unreasonable.”

Moreover, the Court found no prejudice because the jury could reasonably conclude from the totality of the evidence—including Hutchins’ behavior and the context of the drug discovery—that the pills were indeed oxycodone. This aligns with prior Georgia case law emphasizing deference to trial counsel’s strategic decisions unless they are “so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course.” (Hong v. State, 366 Ga. App. 476, 485.)

Key Takeaways

The Hutchins decision underscores several important points for both legal practitioners and defendants in drug-related cases:

1. Sufficiency of Evidence Does Not Always Require Chemical Testing: While chemical testing is the gold standard for identifying controlled substances, visual identification by experts—when corroborated by other evidence—can suffice. This is particularly true when the defendant’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances strongly suggest knowledge of the substance’s nature.
2. Jury’s Role in Resolving Conflicts: The Court repeatedly emphasized the jury’s authority to resolve conflicts in evidence and draw reasonable inferences. Appellate courts are reluctant to second-guess these factual determinations unless the evidence is “insupportable as a matter of law.”
3. Strategic Decisions Are Not Ineffective Assistance: Trial counsel’s decisions about whether to object to certain evidence or pursue specific trial strategies are given significant deference on appeal. To succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, defendants must show not only that the strategy was unreasonable but also that it likely changed the outcome of the trial.
4. Circumstantial Evidence Matters: The Hutchins case highlights how circumstantial evidence—such as the way drugs are stored or hidden—can strengthen the State’s case, even when direct evidence like chemical testing is absent.

Conclusion

The Hutchins case serves as a reminder of the complexities involved in drug prosecutions and appeals. It demonstrates the courts’ reliance on both expert testimony and circumstantial evidence while highlighting the challenges defendants face in overturning convictions based on claims of insufficient evidence or ineffective counsel. For defense attorneys, the case underscores the importance of crafting a clear strategy and making calculated decisions about when to object and when to focus on broader arguments before the jury.

By affirming Hutchins’ convictions, the Georgia Court of Appeals reinforced its commitment to upholding jury verdicts supported by competent evidence, even when the evidence is largely circumstantial. As Georgia’s appellate courts continue to refine their approach to such cases, the lessons from Hutchins will undoubtedly shape future prosecutions and defenses in drug-related matters.

Johnson v. The State (A24A1559)

Georgia Court of Appeals Upholds Suppression of Blood Test Results in Johnson v. The State

In a recent decision, the Georgia Court of Appeals revisited the issue of search warrant scope and evidence suppression in Johnson v. The State (A24A1559), a case stemming from a tragic vehicular homicide that raised significant Fourth Amendment concerns. The Court’s ruling serves as an important reminder of the constitutional safeguards against unreasonable searches and the necessity of precise language in search warrants.

Case Background

Shetabia Johnson was charged with multiple offenses, including first- and second-degree vehicular homicide, DUI less safe, failure to maintain lane, and driving without a valid license. These charges arose from a December 2018 incident in which Johnson’s car crashed into a utility pole, tragically killing a passenger. Following the crash, officers obtained a search warrant to draw and test Johnson’s blood “to determine the extent to which Ms. Johnson had consumed alcohol.” However, subsequent testing revealed the presence of marijuana, which became a key piece of evidence in the State’s case.

Johnson moved to suppress the marijuana test results, arguing that the warrant only authorized testing her blood for alcohol. The trial court initially denied her motion, concluding that once blood was lawfully drawn, any subsequent testing did not require a separate warrant. However, shortly after this ruling, the Georgia Court of Appeals issued a decision in State v. de la Paz, holding that a warrant authorizing a blood draw for alcohol testing does not automatically permit testing for other substances. Johnson filed a motion for reconsideration, and the trial court reversed its earlier decision, suppressing the marijuana test results.

The State appealed, arguing that de la Paz was wrongly decided and did not control this case. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the trial court’s suppression order.

Key Legal Issues

The central issue in Johnson v. The State was whether the scope of the search warrant, which explicitly authorized testing for alcohol, also permitted testing for drugs like marijuana. The Court relied heavily on its prior decision in de la Paz, which emphasized the Fourth Amendment requirement that search warrants must describe with particularity the items to be searched for and seized.

Under Georgia law and constitutional principles, a search warrant must specify the evidence sought. In Johnson, the affidavit supporting the warrant and the warrant itself solely referenced alcohol consumption as the focus of the investigation. There was no mention of drugs or other substances. The Court concluded that the testing for marijuana exceeded the scope of the warrant, rendering the results inadmissible.

Court of Appeals’ Analysis

The Court of Appeals rejected the State’s arguments that de la Paz was wrongly decided. It explained that the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment “must be honored by law enforcement and will be enforced by the courts.” The Court reiterated that search warrants must be specific to the probable cause established in the supporting affidavit. In this case, the warrant clearly limited the search to evidence of alcohol consumption, and the testing for marijuana therefore constituted an unauthorized search.

The State also attempted to distinguish Johnson from de la Paz by pointing out that Johnson faced additional charges, including vehicular homicide, which could involve drug-related impairment. However, the Court found this distinction irrelevant, as the warrant itself did not authorize testing for substances beyond alcohol.

Implications of the Decision

The decision in Johnson v. The State underscores the importance of precision in drafting and executing search warrants. Prosecutors and law enforcement officers must ensure that warrants are narrowly tailored to the probable cause presented to the court. Overstepping the bounds of a warrant—even in good faith—can result in the exclusion of critical evidence, as demonstrated in this case.

 

Additionally, the ruling reaffirms the judiciary’s role as a gatekeeper in protecting constitutional rights. By adhering to the precedent established in de la Paz, the Georgia Court of Appeals sent a clear message that the particularity requirement is not merely a technicality but a fundamental safeguard against unreasonable searches.

Conclusion

In Johnson v. The State (A24A1559), the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the suppression of marijuana test results obtained through a blood draw authorized solely for alcohol testing. This decision highlights the constitutional limitations on search warrants and the necessity of adhering to their explicit terms. As the Court aptly noted, law enforcement must honor the terms and limitations of a warrant, and courts will enforce these protections to ensure that constitutional rights are not compromised.

For practitioners, Johnson serves as a cautionary tale: when seeking or executing search warrants, clarity and specificity are paramount. Failure to respect these principles can jeopardize prosecutions and undermine public confidence in the justice system. If your rights were violated during a DUI investigation, call us for help at 404-581-0999.

Reece v. The State (A24A1709)

Legal Insights: Analyzing Reece v. The State (A24A1709)

In the recent decision of Reece v. The State (A24A1709), the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the critical issue of whether an officer unlawfully prolonged a traffic stop beyond its original scope. Tammy Reece appealed her conviction for trafficking methamphetamine, driving under the influence of drugs, and disregarding a traffic control device, arguing that evidence obtained during the prolonged traffic stop should have been suppressed. Ultimately, the court upheld the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress, providing a detailed analysis of what constitutes reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.

Case Background

The incident began when a police officer observed Reece commit a traffic violation by driving straight through a right-turn-only lane. After stopping her vehicle, the officer requested identification from both Reece and her passenger. Reece complied, but the passenger provided a false name. The officer returned to his patrol car and discovered that the name did not match the passenger’s description in the Georgia Crime Information Center database. This discrepancy raised the officer’s suspicion that the passenger was lying about her identity. Further inquiry and a mobile fingerprint scan revealed that the passenger had outstanding arrest warrants.

During the stop, Reece consented to a vehicle search, which did not yield contraband. However, the passenger later informed the officer that Reece was hiding methamphetamine on her person. Based on this tip, the officer called for a female officer to conduct a physical search of Reece, which ultimately led to Reece’s arrest.

Legal Issues

Reece’s primary argument on appeal was that the officer unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop beyond its original purpose without sufficient reasonable suspicion, thereby violating her Fourth Amendment rights. She contended that the tip from her passenger was unreliable and did not justify extending the stop.

Court’s Analysis

The court began its analysis by affirming long-standing Fourth Amendment principles. Specifically, a traffic stop must be limited in scope and duration to its original purpose unless an officer develops reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity during the encounter. The court highlighted that reasonable suspicion is more than a mere hunch and must be based on “specific and articulable facts” that, when combined with rational inferences, justify further investigation.

Here, the court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop. Several factors contributed to this finding:

1. Discrepancy in the Passenger’s Identity: The passenger’s false name and subsequent admission of her real identity, coupled with the discovery of outstanding warrants, provided a legitimate basis to investigate further.
2. Reece’s Behavior and Statements: Reece interjected during the officer’s questioning of the passenger, falsely providing the passenger’s middle name. This raised concerns that she was actively trying to conceal the passenger’s true identity.
3. The Passenger’s Tip: While Reece argued that the passenger’s tip about the methamphetamine was unreliable, the court noted that the tip had some indicia of reliability. The passenger was providing information face-to-face, which courts have recognized as inherently more reliable than anonymous tips.
4. Reece’s Physical Appearance and Conduct: The officer observed signs of impairment, such as garbled speech and heavy eyelids, which further supported the suspicion that Reece was under the influence.

The court emphasized that the totality of the circumstances, rather than any single factor, justified the officer’s actions. Thus, the officer’s continued detention of Reece was lawful, and the evidence obtained during the stop was admissible.

Key Takeaways

1. Totality of Circumstances Test: Reece reaffirms that courts will assess the reasonableness of a prolonged traffic stop based on the totality of the circumstances. Officers may extend a stop if they develop reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity during the encounter.
2. Tips and Reliability: The decision underscores that tips from known informants or individuals providing information face-to-face are more reliable than anonymous tips. This reliability can support reasonable suspicion when combined with other factors.
3. Behavior During a Stop Matters: A driver’s or passenger’s conduct during a stop—such as providing false information—can contribute to an officer’s reasonable suspicion.
4. Field Sobriety and Observational Evidence: Observable signs of impairment, even if subtle, can support an officer’s decision to investigate further for DUI-related offenses.

Conclusion

The Georgia Court of Appeals’ decision in Reece v. The State highlights the delicate balance between individual constitutional rights and law enforcement’s authority to investigate potential criminal activity. The ruling provides a clear framework for understanding how reasonable suspicion can evolve during a routine traffic stop. For drivers and practitioners alike, the case serves as a reminder of how seemingly minor actions during a stop can have significant legal implications.

This decision is a valuable addition to Georgia’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, offering guidance to law enforcement officers, attorneys, and citizens navigating the complexities of search-and-seizure law.

Canales v. The State (A24A1568)

In the recent Georgia Court of Appeals case Canales v. The State (A24A1568), decided on February 14, 2025, the court addressed significant issues regarding the admissibility of evidence in DUI cases and the procedural safeguards surrounding implied consent under Georgia law. This case provides important insights into the intersection of constitutional protections and DUI enforcement.

Case Background

Carlos Cantor Canales was convicted following a stipulated bench trial of multiple charges, including DUI per se (driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more), DUI less safe, and failure to maintain lane. All charges were merged for sentencing purposes, and Canales was sentenced on the DUI per se charge. Canales appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of his blood test. At the heart of the appeal was whether Canales voluntarily consented to the blood test after receiving an “implied consent” warning.

Legal Issues

The primary issue revolved around the application of Georgia’s implied consent law. Specifically, Canales challenged the voluntariness of his consent to a blood test, arguing that:

1. The implied consent notice was read to him in English, despite Spanish being his first language.
2. The officer failed to clarify whether the blood draw was for investigative purposes or medical diagnostics after Canales suffered a panic attack during processing.

Court’s Analysis and Decision

The Georgia Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial court to reevaluate whether Canales’s consent to the blood draw was voluntary.

Voluntariness of Consent

The court reaffirmed the principle that a warrantless blood draw is a search under the Fourth Amendment and is presumed invalid unless the State can demonstrate an exception, such as voluntary consent. This analysis must consider the “totality of the circumstances,” including the defendant’s ability to understand the implied consent notice.

 

The trial court previously found that Canales had a sufficient understanding of English based on his age, education, and business ownership, as well as his interactions with the officer during the traffic stop. However, the appellate court noted that the trial court failed to analyze whether Canales’s consent remained valid after his panic attack and the subsequent failure of the officer to clarify the purpose of the blood draw at that juncture.

Implied Consent in Georgia

The implied consent law requires officers to inform DUI suspects of their legal obligation to submit to chemical testing and the consequences of refusal. However, actual consent must still be voluntary. The court emphasized that implied consent law does not equate to irrevocable consent; a suspect may still withdraw consent or lack the capacity to consent under certain circumstances.

The court directed the trial court to conduct a more thorough analysis of the voluntariness of Canales’s consent, particularly in light of his medical distress and the officer’s failure to reiterate or clarify the purpose of the blood draw.

Sufficiency of Evidence for DUI Less Safe

Although the court vacated Canales’s conviction for DUI per se, it held that sufficient evidence existed to support the DUI less safe conviction, even without the blood test results. The officer observed Canales’s erratic driving, bloodshot eyes, and strong odor of alcohol, and Canales admitted to drinking before driving. Additionally, Canales failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test. This evidence was deemed sufficient to support the DUI less safe charge under Georgia law.

Practical Implications

The decision in Canales v. The State is significant for several reasons:

1. Language Barriers and Implied Consent: The case underscores the importance of ensuring that defendants understand the implied consent warning, particularly when English is not their first language. Officers may need to take additional steps to ensure comprehension in such situations.
2. Voluntariness of Consent: The court’s emphasis on the totality of the circumstances highlights that a suspect’s state of mind, medical condition, and interactions with law enforcement can all affect the validity of consent.
3. Independent Evidence for DUI Less Safe: Even without chemical test results, other evidence—such as erratic driving, physical symptoms of impairment, and field sobriety test performance—can be sufficient to sustain a DUI less safe conviction.

Conclusion

The Canales decision demonstrates the Georgia Court of Appeals’ careful balancing of constitutional protections against the State’s interest in enforcing DUI laws. By remanding the case, the court signaled the necessity of thorough judicial inquiry into the voluntariness of consent in implied consent cases. This ruling serves as a reminder to law enforcement, prosecutors, and defense attorneys alike to ensure compliance with constitutional standards in DUI investigations.

For legal practitioners, the case reinforces the importance of challenging implied consent procedures when a defendant’s comprehension or voluntariness is in question. On the other hand, it also highlights the availability of independent evidence to support a DUI less safe conviction, even when issues arise with chemical test results.

Understanding these nuances in DUI law is critical for navigating the complexities of implied consent and ensuring that constitutional safeguards are upheld.

At W. Scott Smith, P.C., we’re committed to defending your rights and securing the best possible outcome for your case. If you or a loved one are facing criminal charges, don’t wait. Call us today at 404-581-0999 for a free consultation. Together, we can fight for your future.

If you are arrested for Sexual Battery, please do not make any statements to the police. You will be brought over to court the following day after your arrest and a Magistrate Court judge will consider bond.

A person commits the offense of sexual battery when he intentionally makes physical contact with the intimate parts of the body of another person without the consent of that person.

How does the law define intimate parts? It is defined as the primary genital area, anus, groin, inner thighs, or buttocks of a male or female and the breasts of a female.

The intent to do the act is a question of fact for the jury to decide.

If you believe you had consent, then this is an affirmative defense. The issue at trial will be whether the child consented to the contact. In Georgia, traditionally, children under the age of 16 cannot consent to sexual acts.

However, in State v. Watson, this changed in sexual battery cases. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the offense of sexual battery was not actually a sex crime as it does not require sexual contact. All that is required is physical contact with the intimate body parts of the child.

In State v. Watson, the Court held that the language of the sexual battery statute had the potential to criminalize all sorts of innocent conduct.

The Supreme Court concluded that if the State of Georgia was not required to prove that the act was committed without the child’s consent, then every day activities could subject a person to criminal liability. Thus, actual proof of the child’s lack of consent would be required.

If you are arrested for Sexual Battery in Cobb County, please give us a call at 404-581-0999.

When a person is arrested for DUI, the arresting officer often wants to test the person’s blood to determine if they are under the influence of alcohol or any other drugs. This testing can happen if a person consents to the blood draw or, in the absence of consent, the officer may seek a warrant.

When the officer applies for a warrant, they must lay out what probable cause justifies the granting of a warrant and allows the invasive process of drawing someone’s blood. The officer must also state with particularity the crime that they suspect the individual has committed. It is important to note that DUI in Georgia can be committed in a variety of ways and the officer must state in their application for a warrant which type of DUI they suspect.

Previously, the GBI would begin their testing process by testing the blood for alcohol. If the blood alcohol concentration came back at a level that is considered legal in Georgia (below 0.08 ng/ml), the GBI would automatically perform a drug toxicology test on the blood to determine if the blood contained any drugs.

However, a case decided by the Georgia Court of Appeals in 2024, finds fault with the GBI’s practice. In State v de la Paz, 370 Ga. App. 853, a defendant was arrested for DUI-alcohol. The arresting officer’s report and application for a warrant listed DUI-alcohol as the suspected crime with no mention of any suspicion of drug use. When the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration came back below the legal limit, the GBI automatically tested the blood for drugs. The Court of Appeals found that the drug testing results had to be suppressed because “neither the affidavit nor the application for a search warrant make any reference to suspected drug use. Rather OCGA 40-6-391 (a)(1), driving under the influence of alcohol, was the only suspected crime enumerated in the affidavit and application”.

What does this mean?  If you have been charged with DUI-drugs after the police got a warrant to draw your blood, it is important to hire a lawyer to review the evidence in your case and determine if the warrant authorized the testing of your blood for drugs. The lawyers at W. Scott Smith are skilled in spotting issues that may have compromised your constitutional rights. If you have been charged with DUI, call our office at 404-581-0999 today for a free consultation.