In Wilson v. State, the Georgia Court of Appeals Reverses a Conviction Over Mishandled McCollum/Batson Challenge
In February 2026, the Georgia Court of Appeals issued an important opinion in Wilson v. State that every trial lawyer in Georgia should study carefully. The case involves a classic McCollum/Batson problem: the trial court mishandled the State’s challenge to a defendant’s use of peremptory strikes, reseated a juror over defense objection, and the Court of Appeals reversed.
This decision is a reminder that jury selection is not just about instincts and experience. There is a strict, three-step legal framework that courts must follow whenever there is an allegation that peremptory strikes are being used in a racially discriminatory way. If the trial court skips or compresses those steps, the result can be an illegally constituted jury and a mandatory new trial.
What happened in Wilson
In Wilson, the defendant was tried before a jury on charges arising out of a shooting incident and was ultimately convicted of several offenses, including reckless conduct and criminal damage to property.
During jury selection, the State raised a challenge under Georgia v. McCollum, in which the United States Supreme Court held that the equal protection principles of Batson v. Kentucky apply to defense peremptory strikes in criminal cases. The State pointed out that Wilson is white, the victim is African-American, and that defense counsel had struck all of the non-white jurors from the panel.
The trial court accepted that the State had made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination and turned to defense counsel to explain his strikes. For one juror (Juror 3), an African-American man, defense counsel explained that he was the youngest member of the panel, close in age to the victim, and might therefore identify with him. The Georgia Supreme Court has recognized youth as a facially race-neutral reason for a strike in cases like Dunn v. State and Walker v. State, where striking 21 and 22-year-old jurors “because of their youth” has been held to be race-neutral.
Despite this, the trial court did not allow the State to respond, did not evaluate whether the State had proven discriminatory intent, and simply announced later that it was putting Juror 3 back on the jury. The court also rejected a defense strike of another African-American juror (Juror 35) and reseated her as well, after stating on the record that it was “putting [Juror 3] back on the jury” too.
The Court of Appeals held that this was reversible error. The key problem was that once defense counsel offered a facially race-neutral reason (youth, similarity in age to the victim), the trial court stopped at step two. It never moved to step three to decide whether the State had carried its burden to prove discriminatory intent “in light of all the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity,” as required by cases like Toomer v. State and Edwards v. State.
Because the trial court either rejected the defense explanation at step two or, at best, prematurely deemed it pretextual without a proper step-three analysis, Wilson was tried by an illegally constituted jury. Under decisions such as Chandler v. State, Jackson v. State, Harrison v. State, and Burkett v. State, that error required a new trial. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, making clear that a proper McCollum/Batson analysis is not optional.
A step-by-step approach to McCollum/Batson challenges
Whether you are prosecuting or defending a criminal case in Georgia, you need a disciplined, step-by-step approach when peremptory strikes are challenged on racial grounds. The framework is the same under Batson (when the defense challenges the State’s strikes) and McCollum (when the State challenges the defense’s strikes); only the roles change.
Step one: Establish (or contest) the prima facie case
The party challenging the strikes (the “opponent”) must first establish a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination. In practice, that usually involves:
Identifying the race or ethnicity of the defendant and of the relevant jurors.
Showing a pattern: for example, that all or most jurors of a particular race were struck.
Explaining why those facts support an inference of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.
In Wilson, the State met this burden by pointing out that Wilson is white, the victim is African-American, and defense counsel struck all non-white jurors from the panel.
Once the trial court determines that a prima facie case has been made, the burden of production shifts to the party who exercised the strikes. Importantly, as the Supreme Court of Georgia has emphasized in Daniels v. State, Edwards v. State, and Byrd v. State, the ultimate burden of persuasion on discriminatory intent always remains with the opponent of the strikes, not with the proponent.
Step two: Articulate a facially race-neutral reason
At step two, the burden is on the striking party to explain the strikes. The explanation must be facially race-neutral. It does not have to be persuasive, compelling, or even particularly plausible; it simply cannot be inherently race-based.
Common race-neutral reasons that courts have accepted include youth or age, prior jury service, body language, perceived attitude toward law enforcement, and answers given during voir dire. In Dunn and Walker, age alone was accepted as a valid race-neutral reason.
In Wilson, defense counsel explained that Juror 3 was the youngest juror and closest in age to the victim, and might identify more with the victim. That fits squarely within the type of facially race-neutral reasons recognized in prior precedent.
The trial judge’s role at this step is limited. The question is not whether the reason is persuasive, but whether it is race-neutral on its face. Unless discriminatory intent is inherent in the reason, the court should recognize it as race-neutral and move to step three.
Step three: Decide discriminatory intent in light of all the circumstances
Step three is where the trial court’s discretion and judgment truly matter. The court must decide whether the opponent of the strike has proven purposeful discrimination, considering all relevant circumstances.
This step can include:
Comparing the challenged juror to similarly situated jurors of other races who were not struck.
Assessing whether the explanation makes sense in the context of the case.
Looking at patterns across strikes (for example, if all minority jurors are struck for reasons that are not applied to white jurors with similar characteristics).
Evaluating credibility based on the specificity and case-relatedness of the explanation, as discussed in cases like Byrd and Hogan.
The court should invite the opponent of the strikes to respond, allow both sides to argue, and make an express or implicit finding on discriminatory intent. What the court cannot do is what happened in Wilson: reject the race-neutral reason at step two and terminate the inquiry, or silently assume the explanation is pretextual without ever assessing whether the State carried its burden.
When the court skips or compresses step three, appellate courts have repeatedly reversed. In Jackson and Chandler, the Georgia Supreme Court held that failing to complete the three-step analysis resulted in an illegally constituted jury and required a new trial. The Court of Appeals followed the same path in Wilson, Harrison, Burkett, and Gilbert, emphasizing that the failure to properly perform step three is structural error.
Practical lessons for Georgia lawyers
Wilson offers several practical takeaways for practitioners.
First, preserve the issue. If the court mishandles the McCollum/Batson process in real time, make sure your objection and the grounds are clearly on the record. In Allen v. State, the Supreme Court noted that when the court has already ruled on a McCollum/Batson challenge, you do not need a second “contemporaneous objection” when the juror is actually reseated; the error lies in the prior ruling itself. Still, clarity never hurts.
Second, be specific and consistent. When you are the one offering race-neutral reasons, have your notes in order before the challenge is heard. Be prepared to explain each strike individually. Avoid generic statements and tie your explanation to concrete answers or observations from voir dire. Specific, case-related reasons not only satisfy step two but also make it harder for the opponent to show pretext at step three.
Third, insist on the full three-step analysis. If you are opposing the strikes, ask the court to walk through each step explicitly. If the court tries to reject the explanation at step two as “not race-neutral” when it plainly is (like age), respectfully cite cases such as Jackson, Toomer, Edwards, Dunn, and Walker, and ask the court to allow argument at step three on discriminatory intent.
Fourth, remember that the ultimate burden is on the challenger. Whether you are challenging or defending the strikes, understand that the burden of persuasion always remains with the party alleging discrimination. Your argument at step three needs to focus on why, in context, the pattern of strikes and the explanations offered show (or do not show) purposeful discrimination.
Finally, appreciate the stakes. When a court mishandles a McCollum/Batson challenge, the remedy is not a harmless-error analysis; it is a new trial. The Court of Appeals in Wilson declined to simply remand for a new McCollum hearing because too much time had passed, a different judge now presides, and individual voir dire was not fully transcribed. Following McBride v. State, the court recognized that reconstructing intent from a cold transcript years later is impractical, so the only remedy was reversal and retrial.
Conclusion
Wilson v. State underscores how critical it is that Georgia trial courts strictly follow the three-step McCollum/Batson framework. A single misstep can invalidate an entire trial. For defense lawyers, this case is a powerful tool both to protect your client’s right to a fair and impartial jury and to preserve serious appellate issues when those rights are violated.
If you or a loved one is facing criminal charges in Georgia and you have concerns about how jury selection was handled, you are welcome to contact me to discuss your case and options.
